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Abstracts 
 
Mitter: China emerged from the Korean War as a more confident actor in the 
international order. The paper considers three wider contexts within which China's 
experience of the Korean War should be considered: as part of a spectrum of 20th 
century wars, as part of a Cold War binarism in politics, and as part of a drive toward 
technological modernity. 
 
Nakakita: The Korean armistice which ended the hot war in Asia encouraged 
Japanese political parties of the left and right to amalgamate and inaugurate 'the 
1955 system'. It caused some domestic hardship by further reducing US Special 
Procurements which had played a vital part in reviving Japan's postwar industry. It 
also enabled Japan to re-frame its policies towards China and the US. 
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The Korean Armistice, 1953:  
Meaning and Consequences for China under Mao Zedong 
 
Rana Mitter 
 
'After three years we have won a great victory in the war to resist U S aggression 
and aid Korea,' announced Mao Zedong on 12 September 1953. 'It has now come to 
a halt.'1 As the conflict on the Korean peninsula turned into stalemate, Mao left the 
citizenry of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in no doubt that the recently 
concluded conflict was one of great significance not just in terms of territorial control 
in the region, but rather as part of the statebuilding process within the PRC itself. 
 
War has, of course, been a historically important phenomenon in the reshaping of 
societies around the globe. One of the notable trends in political culture in the United 
States in the 1990s was the rediscovery of past wars as a means of rethinking 
national identity. The war in the Pacific, overshadowed for decades by a less 
glorious-seeming war in Vietnam, now reappeared as the dying 'greatest generation' 
of World War II was celebrated by a younger generation for whom even Vietnam was 
only hearsay. Another war, dubbed 'orgotten'by its veterans, whose memory was 
revived was the one in Korea. A memorial to the US and UN soldiers who fought 
across the 38th parallel between 1950 and 1953 was erected on the Mall in 
Washington DC, a tribute to a conflict in Asia that had been squeezed between the 
more prominent theatres of the Pacific and southeast Asia. It was not true, of course, 
that the conflict had been wholly forgotten in the US. For a decade in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, Alan Alda and the other stars of the television series M*A*S*H, based 
on Robert Altman’s hit movie, had dominated the nation’s television screens with a 
fictionalized, darkly comic, account of the Korean conflict. Yet even the film and 
television series used Korea primarily as a metaphor for the Vietnam conflict and the 
theme of the absurdity of war seemed to reflect a later generation’s cynicism. 
 
But even this dark, questioning take on Korea reflected an assumption that has 
remained very much at the centre of western historiography of the war: that the 
Korean War was primarily an American war. As counterpoint to this, it not just 
important to say that it was also a UN war; the Washington memorial acknowledges 
the many other nations who fought in Korea too. It was also, of course, a war about 
and between Koreans; huge numbers of South and North Koreans fought each other, 
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and the Korean Communist leader Kim Il-sung was instrumental in starting the slide 
to war. But it was also an international war for the eastern bloc. Again, this was 
obviously true for Stalin, trying to carve out spheres of influence as the still malleable 
reordering of the world in the early Cold War began to harden and set. But it was 
also true for the other emergent power in the region, the People’s Republic of China, 
in existence for less than a year when the conflict broke out. The Korean War was 
not just crucial to China because of its status on the latter’s immediate borders. Just 
as the US used the conflict to set boundaries about what its new imperial power 
meant in the new world, so China too reviewed its aims and its own purpose in the 
world through the Korean war; in particular, making it clear that its ambitions were no 
less than what Hedley Bull would call a revolutionary state in the world order.2   
 
The war from the Chinese side 
 
The war emerged in a complex mix of ideological commitment and bluff and double 
bluff. The emergence of new archival sources from the USSR and elsewhere in the 
eastern bloc since the early 1990s has enabled historians to confirm suspicions 
which had long been held about the origins of the Korean War. The sudden collapse 
of the Japanese empire in Asia in 1945 had led to the hasty division of the Korean 
peninsula into a Communist north and non-Communist south. Yet the Northern 
leader, Kim Il-sung, driven by a personal sense of destiny as well as ideological 
commitment, demanded that Stalin assist him in taking the South. Thus challenged, 
Stalin could hardly cry off; but by stating that Mao’s agreement was needed as well, 
he may well have hoped that Mao would let him off the hook by turning down the 
request, which would have enabled Stalin to regret that his ally had prevented him 
from helping further.3  Mao could have been forgiven for declining to take part. The 
PRC was still not stable. The final territories, including Hainan Island and parts of the 
southwest, were not brought under Communist control until well into 1950. Taiwan 
also remained unfinished business. In addition, the new state had to deal with the 
aftermath of a devastating war against Japan and the complete domestic 
transformation of society that the Communist revolution demanded, not least through 
a thorough and often violent campaign of land redistribution in the countryside. 
Although various western powers had moved to recognize the new government, the 
United States remained unwilling to recognize the new regime. Consolidation at 
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home rather than adventures abroad – the choice that had faced the new Soviet 
state in the 1920s – would have been a perfectly sensible strategy. 
 
Yet, perhaps unlike Stalin, who had chosen to concentrate on 'socialism in one 
country', Mao was not just a pragmatist but also a romantic. Stalin had been shaped 
by the dour influences of the Russian Orthodox church (in which he had been in 
training for the priesthood), Tsarist prison camps, and the criminal underworld.  Mao 
had been shaped by one of the most powerful cultural waves anywhere in the world 
in the early twentieth century: the May Fourth Movement which brought a self-
declared 'New Culture' to China, albeit mostly urban China, in the aftermath of the 
1911 revolution. Alienated from his father, Mao travelled from his small Hunan 
birthplace to the regional capital of Changsha, and then on to Beijing, where he 
arrived in 1920. While in the capital, he entered the intellectual maelstrom centred on 
the city’s university. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was ultimately the most 
influential body to emerge from that period, but among the intellectual trends which 
inspired many of the young, such as Mao, who took part in the movement, were 
western-derived ideas which celebrated the self and the ego in a way that Confucian 
cultural norms had frowned upon. Among these ideas, the romanticist celebration of 
the ego, derived from the western nineteenth-century 'revolt against reason', took 
particular hold among some of the young Beijing intellectuals such as Guo Moruo. 
Mao’s exposure to these ideas fed his own sense of personal destiny, providing a 
counterpoint to his other sides: the pragmatist who argued that one should 'seek 
truth from facts' and who painstakingly compiled detailed accounts of local conditions 
as in his 1930 Report from Xunwu county, or the ideological master who skilfully 
adapted Marxism-Leninism to the circumstances of China’s society while still 
maintaining ideological continuity with his Soviet mentors. 'Mao’s military 
romanticism', in the phrase of Shu Guang Zhang, was a powerful thread in his 
decision to enter the Korean War in 1950.4 
Romanticism and ideological conviction led Mao, after much hesitation and 
consultation, to decide to support the North Korean assault on the South, from the 
first attack on 25 June 1950. There was ambivalence, though, as Mao became 
aware of the massive counter-force that the United States was prepared to offer to 
the North Korean and Chinese offensive. Stalin did ultimately provide assistance, but 
displeased Mao with suggestions such as the idea that the Chinese should pay for 
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the military supplies that the USSR was providing on credit. With some 900,000 
Chinese casualties by the end of the war, this did not go down well.  
 
Chen Jian’s essential reassessment of China’s role in the Korean conflict shows that 
Mao’s own personality and aspirations were a key part of the equation. Mao’s regime 
was determined to hold the mantle of revolutionary nationalism, and to foment 
revolutionary world-view within Asia, as well as using the war as part of a strategy to 
legitimate the revolution at home. Despite the stalemate of 1953, Mao in fact found 
himself in a position of even greater prestige and unchallengeability after the ending 
of the war. The duplicitous behaviour of Stalin also had further consequences. 
Having egged Mao on to intervene in the war, Stalin then dawdled in providing 
Soviet support. While Mao continued to speak in terms of Sino-Soviet alliance, this 
experience led him further towards the policy of zili gengsheng or self-reliance. This 
included a new stress on mass mobilization and technological development.5 
 
Chen’s latest work, in his book Mao’s China and the Cold War, makes the same 
argument for China’s reasons for entering and remaining in Korea, but takes the 
story up to the armistice. The Chinese, he shows, were convinced throughout the 
war that they had a potential battlefield superiority which was not always borne out 
by results, or indeed shared by the US/UN side. However, various circumstances, 
including Stalin’s death, the advent of the Eisenhower administration, and a self-
perception at that point that the Chinese could negotiate from strength, led the 
Chinese to agree to the armistice in July 1953. 
 
The armistice itself was not easily won. The Chinese side assumed that an 
agreement would be reached fairly quickly in 1951 because they judged China’s 
position as being strong. However, the demands made by the Chinese, including the 
recognition of the PRC in the UN, led to flat refusal on the US side and meant that 
the negotiations became bogged down. Several issues affected the outcome. 
 
First, there was the issue of prisoners-of-war. The Chinese side believed that the 
Chinese and North Korean wish to exchange all POWs after the conflict had been 
ended would not be problematic for the US, but in practice, the US was reluctant to 
hand over North Koreans or Chinese who did not wish to return to their own 
countries. The argument was phrased as one of human rights, but the US realized 
also that not to hand over such prisoners would be very beneficial as a propaganda 
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thrust against the Communist countries, and furthermore, that the return of large 
numbers of POWs would also give a great manpower boost to the North Korean and 
Chinese sides. Syngman Rhee’s government was also strongly opposed to 
concessions being given to the Communist side. The offer in April 1952 of the return 
of only 70,000 rather than 116,000 POWs was the signal for Qiao Guanhua, Li 
Kenong, and the other negotiators to break off discussions for the time being, as the 
Beijing leadership became convinced that they were in a good position to keep 
fighting and gain a more advantageous position for the resumption of negotiations.6 
 
February 1952 also saw the start of another hotly contested issue of the time, the 
accusations that the US was carrying out bacteriological warfare in North Korea and 
Manchuria. It certainly seems clear that the Chinese leadership genuinely believed 
that biological weapons (BW) were being used against them. There was recent 
historical precedent; Northeast China (Manchuria) had had the grim experience of 
being used as the base for Japanese BW experiments in the notorious Unit 731, and 
the Nationalist-controlled areas of China during the war against Japan had been 
attacked with anthrax bombs and other biological weapons. However, conclusive 
evidence that BW was used against the Chinese in the Korean War has yet to 
emerge. Nonetheless, as a moral counterblast to the POW issue, BW was highly 
effective, and prominent western sympathizers with China such as Joseph Needham 
took the Chinese side very strongly.7 
 
The ending of the war in 1953 came shortly after the death of Stalin. This was one of 
the most shocking events for the Chinese leadership. Mao in particular had had a 
tempestuous but nonetheless deeply-felt relationship with the Soviet leader. Stalin 
had given often disastrous advice to the CCP from the 1920s onwards, and Mao’s 
development of a rural revolution was a reaction in part to Comintern advice drawn 
from Leninist experience that simply did not apply to China. During the recent Civil 
War, Stalin had played double and triple bluff with his Chinese colleagues, 
temporarily brushing them off when it appeared that a deal with the Nationalist 
government of Chiang Kaishek might be more advantageous. Yet Stalin had also 
been an ideological inspiration, the leader of a world revolution that had but one 
member until the end of World War II, and a natural ideological ally in the emerging 
Cold War. It has now quite often been observed, but bears repetition, that America 
did not lose its chance to be friends with Communist China in the 1950s. It might well 
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have been wise to open diplomatic relations much earlier – isolation from the outside 
world certainly contributed to the inward-looking nature of Chinese ideology in the 
1950s and 1960s – but the idea that there could have been much closer cooperation 
is surely misleading. Stalin and Mao saw world through the kind of similar lenses that 
Dulles and Eisenhower never would.8 
 
Nonetheless, the death of Stalin did provide a catalyst to the armistice finally being 
signed. Kathryn Weathersby has shown that by late 1952, the Chinese position had 
moved closer to the one espoused by the North Koreans earlier that year, that an 
armistice should indeed be negotiated. But Stalin’s intransigence meant that he 
refused to consider this compromise. His sudden death on 5 March 1953 meant that 
the new Soviet leadership could, tortuously, change their line and argue for an 
armistice.9 
 
The historiography of the Chinese involvement in the Korean War has been 
developing rapidly in both English and Chinese, and this brief account of the way in 
which some of the major scholars have approached the question cannot do anything 
like full justice to the richness of their arguments.  Instead, I would suggest that 
interested readers refer not only to the texts mentioned here, but the excellent 
guides to further reading which these books contain. 
 
Instead, I would like to go on from this account of the detail of how and why China 
agreed to end its involvement in the Korean War to looking at some of the reasons 
why this was a significant turning point, and providing both context and consequence. 
Rather than arguing about large numbers of specific incidents, I want to place the 
Korean war in several contexts: first, the ending of the Korean War as part of a 
longer sequence of conflicts that had been raging since the 1930s and even before; 
secondly, the importance of the war in placing China within the Cold War binary; and 
thirdly, but not least, the importance of the war as part of Mao and the Communist 
party’s solidifying of its domestic rule. 
 
Korea: a war among wars 
 
First, the context of 1953 as a time in Chinese history needs to be remembered. In 
just five years, from 1945 to 1950, China ended one eight-year-long war against 
Japan, went through three years of civil war, and then plunged, yet again, into a war 
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on its immediate borders. Two assumptions have often been made about 1949. One 
is that China, after years of weakness, finally 'stood up' in the face of foreign 
aggression, whereas it had previously been weak. Another was that it ushered in a 
period of peace. 
 
The Korean War and its end point in 1953 can certainly been seen as a radical shift 
in China’s international role and status, from being a victim or secondary power to 
one which sought to change the international environment and found itself powerful 
enough to do so. This has been the most usual, and convincing, way of situating the 
conflict in China’s wider century. 
 
Yet it is also important to see Korea as part of a continuity of conflict, and the 
legitimacy that accompanied the way in which the Chinese state coped with war. As 
Hans van de Ven has shown in his recent book, war and the militarization of political 
culture marks most of the early twentieth century in China. The division of the 
country into areas of control under rival militarists led to constant warfare; the war 
against Japan saw the country divided into Nationalist, Communist and 
collaborationist areas. The civil war then further divided society, as O. A. Westad has 
demonstrated.  The 'scars of war', as Lary and MacKinnon put it, were strongly in the 
minds of all Chinese by 1949.10 
 
Since the CCP’s legitimacy in part derived from its ability to unite and pacify China, 
entry into the Korean War just a year or so after the new state’s foundation was a 
gamble, just as much as it had been for a Truman or Attlee administration dealing 
with war-weary America or Britain. It also contributed to the continued militarization 
of society. The decision to go to war was not something that was exclusively of 
relevance to a communist society, therefore. While the new ideological thrust in 
Chinese society was shaped by the CCP, the need to deal with state legitimacy was 
an extension of the existing nationalist agenda that had been pursued by all Chinese 
governments in the twentieth century. In addition, the nature of the question about 
the relationship between war and statebuilding was one which all twentieth-century 
Chinese governments had grappled with. In the case of Korea, the question was 
different in crucial respects from that faced by the Nationalists or the militarist 
governments which had preceded it. Those earlier governments had had to deal with 
war on Chinese territory itself, either civil war or else invasion and occupation by 
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foreign powers. In the case of the PRC, the choice was whether to assist in a war 
outside Chinese borders. 
 
Yet in the circumstances of the time, and judging by recent precedent, the case may 
not have looked as different to the PRC leadership, when comparing it to earlier wars, 
as it appears to us now. There was no guarantee that a hostile Korean state on 
Chinese borders might not be the bridgehead to a western-sponsored attempt to 
recapture control of China for Chiang Kaishek. Certainly Chiang himself was heard 
to tell close advisers that World War III, which he anticipated coming swiftly, would 
be the chance for the Nationalists to redeem themselves and retake the mainland. 
The memory of the 1931-37 period would also have been strong in the minds of CCP 
leaders. In this interval between the occupation of Manchuria and the outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese War, it was unclear whether China and Japan were at peace or war. 
During the run-up to the war against Japan, on the one hand, the two countries had 
diplomatic relations and no open conflict was declared. On the other hand, the 
Japanese had occupied large parts of Chinese territory by military force, launched 
one short but bloody military campaign in Shanghai in 1932, and moved steadily into 
North China between 1935 and 1937. The political atmosphere certainly reflected an 
expectation of war as the decade moved on. In the same way, the fact that no actual 
war was taking place on Chinese territory in the middle of 1950 (as opposed to most 
of the period from 1937 to 1949) was no guarantee that such a war might not break 
out very shortly.  Political decisions by the superpowers, and in particular, a 
preference for proxy wars rather than direct confrontation, meant that, ultimately, the 
Korean War was contained to the Korean peninsula itself. However, that did not 
prevent the PRC leadership and Mao in particular from seeing it as the starting point 
for a much wider rebuilding of society.  That rebuilding not only created a new China, 
but also addressed problems and issues of statebuilding which the modern state had 
been grappling with for decades. 
 
The ending of the Korean War, after all, provided the political circumstances in which 
Mao was able to increase the mobilization, militarization, and politicization of the 
state as a whole. The use of the War against Japan as a 'good war', a war which 
could provide a unifying theme to bind a nation together (to use Studs Terkel’s 
ironically-intended phrase slightly anachronistically) was difficult. This was because 
of the clashes – Nationalist versus communist, anti-Japanese versus collaborationist 
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– that made it difficult to find a dominant interpretation of the war around which to 
unite. In this sense, the history of the war was quite different from that of China’s 
new ally, the USSR, or the other Allied powers – UK, US, etc – which had been 
unequivocally on the winning side. Instead, the complex memory of war was more 
akin to that in France, with contested and repressed memories.11 
 
However, the ambivalent victory in Korea in 1953 was sufficient to allow the state to 
portray it as a 'good war': in other words, an ideologically uplifting and worthwhile 
exercise that gave some kind of legitimacy to yet another episode in the string of 
international conflicts of which Korea was just the latest over some four decades. 
Many years later, in the reform era, the War of Resistance would also be recast as a 
'good war', and a means for the Nationalists to be brought back subtly into the 
national narrative, but the wounds of the civil war, and the seeming menace of 
Chiang Kaishek on Taiwan, were far too recent for this to be a possibility in the 
1950s. Therefore, Chinese fiction and culture glorified the Korean war as a recent 
successful and fraternal blow for the progressive states of the Communist world. 
 
Korea and China’s Cold War 
 
The Korean War also entered China’s political culture in a variety of ways. The way 
in which the war had escalated emphasized existing tendencies in the Manicheanism 
of Maoist ideological politics. It has been observed that one of the products of the 
New Cold War history is that it restores ideology to a position of importance: the 
belief on both sides in the importance of their ideologies was of central importance to 
their identity and behaviour.12 
 
The ability of the Chinese leadership to present the Korean armistice as a victory, 
but one which was won at immense cost and sacrifice, was a highly useful tool to 
enable the still new PRC regime to adapt, but also fit into, particular ideological and 
cultural models which shaped, and continue to shape, Chinese modernity. For a start, 
the most ostensible division that was made was between the communist and the 
capitalist worlds.  The condemnation of Khrushchev by the Chinese leadership in 
1956 was fuelled by a sense of betrayal at the willingness of the new leader to 
condemn Stalin and ratchet down tensions with the US in particular (the state which 
continued to refuse to recognize the PRC). 
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But the binary split that shaped the Cold War was also very noticeable in the way 
that language was used in and around the Korean War. The anti-Enlightenment, 
fascist vision of 'anti-rational' modernity that had held sway in much of the world 
before World War II became irrelevant after the defeat of the Axis powers. This led to 
the curious scenario by which two different version of Enlightenment modernity were 
competing for ownership of the same language during the Cold War.  Fascism had 
ostensibly rejected ideas of rationality, progress, democracy, and so forth as 
bourgeois conceits. Both liberal market capitalism and communism, in contrast, 
spent the Cold War claiming ownership of these terms, and in a notable incongruity, 
the bourgeois, targets of fascism before 1945, were now blamed by the communists 
too for not living up to the standards of modernity. 
 
Various ideological tendencies which predated the Cold War now affected the way in 
which the Korean conflict helped to shape the PRC’s self-image in the world. First of 
all was the strong Social Darwinist tendency that argued that China was in danger of 
'disappearance' or 'extermination'.13  This remained an absolute constant throughout 
the Mao period (and beyond), the difference being that China was in a position of 
relative strength after 1949; it therefore had the paradox of being a strong state 
which believed itself weak in the international system. Chinese communism, of 
course, was heavily shaped by Social Darwinist assumptions from its earliest days, 
as Mao’s obsessions with youth, physical exercise and militarism showed. The 
Korean war provided an object lesson in this sort of continuing dualistic zero-sum 
view of the international system. This was further informed by two other pre-1949 
cultural currents. One was the strong influence of Bolshevist models on both 
Communist and Nationalist political thought because of the strong Comintern 
influence of the early 1920s, which drowned out the previous anarchist concentration.  
In addition, the legacy of the Confucian black and white view of what was orthodox 
and morally correct clearly shaped Communist thinking from the earliest twentieth 
century.14 
 
The Korean armistice also opened the way for China, for the next decade and a half 
to place itself at odds with the normative institutions of the post-1945 international 
order. For the western world, the vision of the UN fighting a rogue North Korean 
regime aided by a mysterious and frightening Chinese communist state was an 
occasion when good and evil were clearly defined. Yet for the PRC, the UN was 
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hardly a respectable organization. Not only did it deny China entry (despite repeated 
attempts by Zhou Enlai to make PRC entry a condition of peace in Korea), but worse, 
allowed the Manichaean enemy, Taiwan, to masquerade as the true face of 'China'. 
In contrast, the USSR was a founder member of the UN, and however fierce the 
Cold War dichotomy  became, it was always still integrated into the international 
order, which China, as a non-participant state, was clearly not. In effect, the 
exclusion of the USSR from the old League of Nations was being repeated with the 
PRC, and with similar consequences in terms of the domestic turn inwards as a 
result of internationalist isolation. 
 
The end result was that the moral certainty of China’s revolutionary diplomacy was 
bolstered by the experience of Korea. The armistice had not provided an 
overwhelming victory in reality, yet China’s worst fears had not been realized. There 
was not a hostile, fiercely anti-Communist state right on China’s northeast border, as 
had seemed possible at the height of MacArthur’s thrust in 1950. In addition, China 
was now seen as a powerful actor in its own right, in a way that would have seemed 
impossible even a decade or so earlier, when the country was ravaged by the 
Japanese occupation and still subject to laws of extraterritoriality which had been 
imposed a century earlier.   
 
The Korean success was a go-ahead signal for the strengthening of Mao’s 
revolutionary diplomacy, and simultaneously for the growing split with the Soviet 
Union. These two tendencies, it is not an exaggeration to say, exacerbated a 
tendency that had begun by the late 1930s; the rejection of the internationalist model 
of politics that had been so key to the early Republican era when China’s May Fourth 
'New Culture' had held strong. The values of this era had been distinctly outward-
looking, a fact due to circumstances both voluntary and forced. Imperialism had 
meant that China could not look inward even if it had wished to do so, yet the elite 
and grassroots culture alike were flavoured by an internationalism that was largely 
shaped by a conviction that the outside world, while a source of menace, might also 
provide solutions to China’s crisis. In contrast, the Mao era marked a distinct turning 
inward. William Kirby has pointed out that for a decade, at least, China continued to 
look outward, but in one direction only: toward the Soviet Union.15 Yet even this 
marked a distinct change from the riot of intellectual possibilities and political 
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solutions that the pre-1949 period had offered. Korea consolidated the narrowing of 
possibilities. 
 
Korean War and class war 
 
An irony of the Maoist era was that, despite the ostensibly inward turn of public 
culture in China, international events continued to be highly influential on 
developments in policy. A few years later, for example, it was the events in Hungary 
and Poland in 1956 that led Mao to think that it would be necessary to allow more 
free voice for the intellectuals in China, leading to the Hundred Flowers campaign of 
the following year. In the case of Korea, the outbreak of war had allowed the 'Resist 
America, aid Korea' campaign to galvanize politics across China in the first year of 
the PRC. At the war’s conclusion, Mao’s speech at the time made it clear that the 
consolidation of domestic rule in China would be explicitly tied to the 'victory' in 
Korea. Thus Mao took on those who had complained about the rise in taxation that 
had been mandated to pay for the war: 
 
Last year and the year before last, the agricultural tax was a shade on the 
heavy side, and so this set some friends talking. At this time, we had to do our 
utmost to win victory in the war to resist US aggression and aid Korea. For the 
peasants, for the people of the whole country, which was in their interest? 
Undoubtedly winning the war was in their interest. It was because the war 
required money that we collected a bit more in agricultural tax last year and 
the year before.16 
 
Mao moved on to make explicit links between the recent past and the immediate 
tasks in the future: 
 
Now some friends wanted us to give up the war to resist US aggression and 
aid Korea, and now they want us to give up the building of heavy industry. We 
must criticize this erroneous view.17 
 
The ending of the Korean war also marked the end of the first phase of consolidation 
of the PRC government. The united front policies and tactical accommodation that 
had marked its earliest years began to fall away, and the prestige that Mao had 
gained from China’s entry into the war allowed him to exercise the romanticist 
tendencies that would lead to much stronger campaigns against 
'counterrevolutionaries' as well as the collectivist excesses of the Great Leap 
Forward in the late 1950s. Although the conflict itself was over, Mao’s language 
made it clear that the war footing on which the country had been based was being 
 13
transferred to the internal task of class warfare. The 'US aggressors' and 'running 
dogs' which had been propaganda targets were now transposed to the immediate 
task of refashioning society fundamentally. 
 
As well as mass mobilization, Mao’s China used the Korean experience to stimulate 
the new state’s need to develop high technology; as Chen Jian points out, this led to 
the development of China’s atomic bomb.18  As with the experience of war, the 
obsession with technology was also part of a trajectory of thought that had emerged 
in the late nineteenth century. The Qing dynasty had attempted “self-strengthening” 
through the development of western technology, and this tendency had been 
emphasized yet further during that same May Fourth era when Mao had helped 
found the CCP. 'Science and democracy' had been the catchphrase of the May 
Fourth movement, and the idea that scientific modernity might be a panacea that 
would bring China into modernity was fixed in the minds of most of the elite leaders 
of the early twentieth century, whether Nationalist or Communist in orientation. The 
Korean confrontation further strengthened the conviction of the CCP that the 
development of technology was necessary to the state. However, the increasing 
suspicion of Soviet help, on which Stalin seemed to have been lukewarm, also 
pushed Mao toward the policy of 'self-reliance' (zili gengsheng). The tension 
between these goals, one of which seemed to be oriented toward cooperation with 
the outside world, the other to reject it, would lead to the disastrously contradictory 
campaigns of the high Maoist era, such as the backyard steel smelters of the Great 
Leap Forward, and the self-aggrandizing xenophobia of the Cultural Revolution. 
 
Conclusion 
 
China’s involvement with the Korean War has moved out of the shadows of 
historiography in the last decade. The war was clearly a turning-point in the fledgling 
PRC’s reorientation within the international system. Yet it is also clear that in term of 
domestic politics and culture, the success of Mao’s gamble, however ambivalent, 
also became the basis of a new energy in the shaping of the Communist state. 
Korea had a powerful domestic effect around the world; it was certainly instrumental 
in the defeat of the Democrats for the White House in 1952 after twenty years. In 
Mao’s China too, Korea became part of the militarized, unstable mixture that had 
marked statebuilding throughout the twentieth century. 
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The Korean Armistice and Japanese Politics: 
The Establishment of the 1955 System 
 Koji Nakakita 
 
In this paper I assess the effects of the Korean War and especially the Korean 
Armistice in influencing Japanese politics. This is generally described as the transition 
to the 1955 system1, a subject on which I have published a book entitled 1955 Nen 
Taisei no Seiritsu (The Establishment of the 1955 System in Japanese Politics)2. In 
Japan the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party merged into the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) on 15 November 1955 and the Left-wing and the Right-wing of the Japan 
Socialist Party (JSP) reunited into a single party on 13 October. After that, until the 
birth of the Hosokawa cabinet on 9 August 1993, the LDP was continuously in office 
and the JSP was the biggest opposition party. The year 1955 was therefore a 
significant turning point in postwar Japanese politics and its relationship with the 
Korean War is an interesting subject of study.  
 
Under the 1955 system the LDP had approximately two thirds of the seats in the 
House of Representatives and the JSP obtained the remaining one third of the seats. 
The party system was called the 'one and a half party system' since it was composed 
of two major parties but virtually did not allow for change of power between them3. 
Nevertheless, we should not regard the 1955 system as a mere party system. It is a 
fact that the core of the 1955 system dealt with political parties, but it was a huge 
political system which spread to foreign relations and industrial relations4. Talks for 
normalization in diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union were 
initiated in 1955 and in the same year Japan was admitted to complete its accession 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As to industrial relations, the 
Japan Productivity Centre (JPC) (Nihon Seisansei Honbu) was established by the 
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employer’s associations in cooperation with the Right-wing trade unions and the 
Spring Labour Offensive (Shunto) started on the initiative of the General Council of 
Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo). Therefore, in order to do some research on the 
establishment of the 1955 system, we should analyze not only political parties but 
also relations with foreign countries as well as the employers’ associations and the 
trade unions. 
 
Easing of Tension after the Korean Armistice 
What was the major factor which defined the interaction leading to the establishment 
of the 1955 system? Some political historians have pointed out that it was the 
outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, in other words, the outbreak of the 'Hot 
War' in East Asia5. Consequently, rearmament in Japan developed gradually: the 
Police Reserve Force was formed according to General Douglas MacArthur’s 
instructions in the following month, upgraded to the Public Security Force in 1952 and 
reorganized into the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) two years later. The 
economy then recovered rapidly depending on the special procurements of the 
American military involved in the Korean War. Moreover, the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, without the participation of the Soviet Union and Communist China, and the 
Japan-US Security Treaty were signed on the same day in 1951 linking Japan closely 
to American military strategy in East Asia. Japanese conservative parties, especially 
the ruling Liberal Party led by the Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, promoted policies 
of dependence on the United States and militarization. Opposing this, the two 
socialist parties, in particular the Left-wing Socialist Party, insisted on the 'unarmed 
neutrality policy' which mainly consisted of the defence of the Constitution (in 
particular its peace clause) and neutral diplomacy aimed at easing the tension 
between the two blocs. This polarization of political parties led ultimately to the 
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formation of the LDP and the reunion of the JSP. 
 
I fully admit the importance of the outbreak of the Korean War for postwar Japanese 
politics6. Nevertheless, the major factor which led directly to the establishment of the 
1955 system was the Korean Armistice on 27 July 1953, to be more precise, the 
easing of tension which started from the Korean Armistice, but accelerated strongly 
with the Indochinese Armistice on 21 July 1954, bringing about the summit 
conference of the four powers in Geneva on 18 July 1955. This meant the end of the 
'Hot War' in Asia and the establishment of the Cold War in the real sense of the term. 
The boundaries of the two blocs were practically almost determined. The Cold War 
virtually reached a deadlock which was expected to last for a long time. As a result, 
the importance of military power decreased compared with political or economic 
power. Globally the exchanges between the two blocs developed by degrees7. This 
was also true in Japan. In general, de-militarization started and independence from 
the United States increased. There was a decline of special procurements which 
meant militarization and the increased dependence of the Japanese economy on the 
United States. There was also a rise in the demand for trade in non-military goods 
with Communist China. In my opinion, this was the direct background to the 
establishment of the 1955 system.8 
 
Decrease of Special Procurements 
After the outbreak of the Korean War, the US military placed orders with Japanese 
firms for goods and services they needed in order to wage the war. Needless to say, it 
was anticipated that, as soon as the Korean War ended, the special procurements 
would decrease so much that the Japanese economy would go into crisis. On 5 
March 1953 Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union died and the move towards the Korean 
Armistice started. Then, Japanese stock prices fell drastically, which concerned the 
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US Government deeply. There was a possibility that Japanese business circles might 
be tempted to develop trade with Communist China if the Japanese economy 
declined because of its shortage of foreign currency. In order to keep Japan in the 
Free World, the US State Department publicly promised the maintenance of the 
amount of special procurements in Japan on 15 April. Although stock prices rose 
sharply, the assurance was actually a kind of expectation.  
 
The Japanese government expected assistance from the United States based on the 
US Mutual Security Act (MSA) to compensate for the decrease in special 
procurements. In the negotiations for a Mutual Security Assistance Agreement started 
on 15 July 1953, the Yoshida Government was anxious to get as much assistance as 
possible, not only military assistance but also economic assistance, without 
reinforcing Japan’s defence forces. But the Eisenhower administration denied 
economic assistance to Japan and asked her to strengthen her military power. 
Consequently, the Japanese Government failed to attain its purpose of acquiring the 
assistance equivalent to the loss of special procurements. The agreement was signed 
on 8 March 1954 and came into effect on 1 May, which was much later than expected. 
 
In the spring of 1954, the drastic decrease of special procurements became obvious. 
The Japanese government therefore called on the US government for talks referring 
to the American public assurance of the previous year in April. Nevertheless, the US 
government was pessimistic about the maintenance of special procurements in Japan 
on account of the Korean Armistice. Moreover, the Indochinese War was over by July 
1954 and resulted in a further decrease of special procurements. The talks started on 
11 August, developed into a sharp conflict between the two countries and ended 
without any final agreement in April 1955. As a result, the Japanese defence industry 
which had revived owing to the Korean War suffered serious losses and quite a few 
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munitions companies went bankrupt or scaled down their business operations. 
 
One of the reasons of the trouble was that the Japanese government was reluctant to 
increase its defence forces. Furthermore, the Yoshida administration decided to cut 
defence spending in the budget for the 1954 fiscal year at the cabinet meeting on 29 
June. This was part of its austerity measures for the purpose of overcoming the deficit 
in the international balance of payments due to reductions in special procurements. 
Defence spending was something which had been agreed in the MSA talks, so the 
US government severely criticized the Yoshida cabinet. But the austerity measures 
were so indispensable to the Japanese economy that Yoshida did not change his 
decision and the next Hatoyama cabinet followed these austerity measures and 
decreased defence spending for the 1955 fiscal year. The defence spending cut was 
one of the reasons why the US government did not try hard enough to increase its 
special procurements. The Japanese economy was de-militarized both by the 
reduction of the special procurements on the US side and by the limitation in defence 
spending on the Japanese side. 
 
Improving Relations with Communist Countries 
After the Korean Armistice Communist China and the Soviet Union started expressing 
their intentions to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan and strengthened their 
so-called 'peace offensives' after the Indochinese Armistice of 21 July 1954. After that 
there was an increasing momentum in Japan towards the normalization of diplomatic 
relations with communist countries. The 'National Congress for the Normalization of 
Diplomatic Relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union' (Nitchu Nisso 
Kokko Kaifuku Kokumin Kaigi) was formed on 28 October. Its members included 
conservative political and business leaders. Even pro-American Ikeda Hayato, the 
secretary general of the ruling Liberal Party, suggested an improvement in relations 
 
22
with Communist China twice in the middle of August, which greatly shocked the US 
government. After the resignation of the Yoshida cabinet, Hatoyama Ichiro organized 
a cabinet with the policy of improving relations with communist countries on 10 
December and formally decided to begin normalization talks with the Soviet Union on 
4 February 1955. 
 
It was not as easy to improve relations with Communist China as compared to the 
Soviet Union because it had actually fought against the United States in the Korean 
War and had no diplomatic relations with the United States. Japan had established 
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) on 28 April 1952 under 
pressure from the United States. Since both the Chiang Kai-Shek regime and the Mao 
Tse-Tung regime claimed to represent the whole of China, the recognition of the 
former made that of the latter difficult. Nevertheless, there were strong demands for 
improvement in the relations with Communist China because of the recession due to 
the reduction of special procurements. Trade with Communist China, which had been 
strictly limited under the agreement with the United States, was considered even by 
influential conservative business and political leaders as the most effective measure 
to revive the Japanese economy in the view of the huge scale of prewar trade with 
China. The 'Association for the Promotion of International Trade in Japan' (Nihon 
Kokusai Boeki Sokushin Kyokai) was established on 22 September 1954 by Murata 
Shozo who had a close connection with Prime Minister Yoshida. Two cabinet 
ministers of the Hatoyama cabinet, Ishibashi Tanzan, the Minister of International 
Trade and Industry, as well as Takasaki Tatsunosuke, the Director General of the 
Economic Planning Agency, were its members.  
 
Before that, private (un-official) trade agreements between Japan and Communist 
China had been signed twice in Beijing to enable and enlarge bilateral trade. The 
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second agreement was to lose effect by the end of 1954. Murata made every effort to 
start negotiations in Tokyo for the third agreement. Communist China and 
pro-Communist China groups in Japan intended to boost private exchanges in order 
to bring about the normalization of diplomatic relations and considered a third private 
trade agreement as an important step. The critical point of this process was the 
official authorization of the clause which would permit the setting up of offices for 
trade representatives both in Tokyo and Beijing. Prime Minister Hatoyama who 
intended to improve relations with Communist China sometimes made slips of the 
tongue, implying recognition of both Chinese regimes. Hatoyama privately agreed to 
Murata’s proposal for the setting up of offices for trade representatives. On 23 March 
1955 the Hatoyama administration issued visas for the members of the Chinese 
Trade Mission and filled in the category for nationality 'the People’s Republic of 
China'. 
 
Reunion of the Socialist Parties 
This situation was favourable particularly to the Left-wing Socialist Party and its power 
base Sohyo, the largest national trade union centre in Japan. After the outbreak of the 
Korean War, the different opinions over the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 
Japan-US Security Treaty had split the JSP into two parties. The Left-wing then 
insisted on the 'unarmed neutrality policy', totally opposing dependence on the United 
States and militarization. On the other hand, the Right-wing was pro-American and 
accepted limited rearmament on the same level as the Police Reserve Force. 
Nevertheless, because of the easing of tension mostly after the Indochinese 
Armistice, the policies of the Right-wing came closer to those of the Left-wing. On 11 
November 1954 the two parties agreed on some general policies to be implemented 
by their coalition government, including the normalization of diplomatic relations with 
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Communist China and the Soviet Union. This policy agreement enabled the reunion 
of the JSP. 
 
Furthermore, the conservatives were divided mainly into two parties: the Liberal and 
the Progressive Party. The Liberal Party led by Yoshida lost its absolute majority in 
the House of Representatives in the general election held on 19 April 1953 though it 
stayed in power until 7 December 1954. That is to say, conservative rule became 
rather weak. The Democratic Party, which was formed on 24 November 1954 being 
based mainly on the Progressive Party, cooperated with both socialist parties and 
succeeded in overthrowing the Yoshida cabinet and establishing the Hatoyama 
cabinet. The socialist parties cast their vote for Hatoyama in the Diet nomination for 
the Prime Minister. This was not because they supported Hatoyama, but because 
they were longing for a general election. There was no possibility of a coalition 
government between Democrats and Socialists. However, it was important that these 
socialist parties were strong enough to affect the outcome on the political scene. 
 
In this situation, the leaders of the socialist parties thought they could come into 
power in the near future if they would reunite. The main purpose of the reunion was to 
capture the reins of government. Therefore, they tried to make realistic policies as 
close as possible to those of the conservatives. The policies agreed on 11 November 
1954 included maintaining or reducing the JSDF instead of breaking it up. Moreover, 
they promised to reunite for the electoral campaign. The result of the general election 
of 27 February 1955 was as follows: the Democratic Party 185, the Liberal Party 112, 
the Left-wing Socialist Party 89 and the Right-wing Socialist Party 67. Total seats of 
both socialist parties were 156, which was 18 seats more than in the previous 
election.  
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The conservative parties, business circles and the US government were greatly 
concerned at these results. Although there were some serious conflicts among them 
over certain issues such as the special procurements mentioned previously, they all 
coped with the threat from the JSP. Their countermeasures needed to be more than 
the merger of the conservative parties because the threat from the JSP was not only 
its seats in the Diet but also its policies enforced by the easing of the international 
tension. The main part of their countermeasures was how to deal with the moves 
towards de-militarization and independence from the United States after the Korean 
Armistice. The easing of tension did not mean the end of the Cold War but the 
establishment of the Cold War in the real sense of the term. Therefore, the “unarmed 
neutrality policy” should be kept in check. Independence from the United States must 
be restricted so as not to damage the extent of Japan-US cooperation. 
De-militarization should be just the priority of economic power over military power. 
 
Integration of the Japanese Economy into the Western Bloc 
As mentioned before, Murata Shozo, the President of the 'Association for the 
Promotion of International Trade in Japan', arranged negotiations in Tokyo for the 
third private trade agreement between Japan and Communist China. Prime Minister 
Hatoyama supported it and business circles such as the Japan Federation of 
Economic Organizations (Keidanren) endorsed it. The US administration feared this 
situation and pressed the new government not to get involved in such negotiations. 
Firstly, on 6 March 1955 it was reported in the newspapers that trading companies 
conducting transactions in Communist China would be prohibited from any dealings 
with the United States. Fearing US sanctions, business circles retreated from such 
negotiations. Secondly, on 7 April the US ambassador John Allison handed 
Hatoyama a memorandum calling on him not to support negotiations. The Hatoyama 
cabinet, lacking a strong political base in the Diet, had no choice but to accept it. 
Accordingly, the negotiations which started on 1 April ended with a third agreement 
containing no official authorization for the setting up of trade representatives’ offices. 
This meant the failure of economic exchanges for the normalization of diplomatic 
relations. 
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Furthermore, the US government supported Japan’s complete accession to the GATT 
with the aim of Japan’s integration into the western international economic order so 
that the Japanese economy would not require trade with Communist China. The 
Eisenhower administration had to help Japan economically in some ways since 
Japan’s desire for trade with China was related to the special procurements problem 
and would endanger US strategy in East Asia. But Eisenhower was financially 
conservative and the US government rejected the Japanese government’s request for 
economic assistance. The Japanese government attempted to use the economic 
development of Southeast Asia in order to draw funds from the United States. Prime 
Minister Yoshida visited the United States in November 1954 and proposed an 'Asia 
Marshall Plan'. However, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles flatly refused it 
because of lack of funds. 'Trade, not Aid' was the most important principle in 
Eisenhower’s foreign policy, which was also applied in the case of Japan. The US 
government attempted to realize Japan’s complete entry to the GATT for the purpose 
of enlarging its exports to free countries. 
 
Although the Japanese government and business circles were eager for a full 
membership of the GATT, there were two groups of opponents. The first was the US 
congress then controlled by the Republican Party. It had a tendency toward 
protectionism. The Eisenhower administration requested it to give the president the 
authority to reduce tariffs on goods imported from Japan, stressing the threat from 
communists. Congress passed a law for the new Reciprocal Trade Agreement on 1 
July 1954, which enabled tariff negotiations with Japan. The second opponents were 
the signatories to the GATT. They were afraid of huge Japanese exports. But the US 
government persuaded them to enter into tariff negotiations with Japan. As a result, 
Japan was admitted to the GATT on 10 September 1955. Some countries, including 
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the UK, resorted to article 35 to suspend the effects on the bilateral exchanges. But 
Japan vastly expanded her trade with the United States, which became an important 
factor underlying her high economic growth.  
 
Domestic Measures for Economic Development 
In order to overcome the shortage of foreign currency due to the decrease of special 
procurements, the Japanese government adopted a retrenchment policy. The 
Yoshida cabinet made an austerity budget for the 1954 fiscal year which is known as 
the 'one billion yen budget'. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) also vigorously pursued a tight 
money policy. Hatoyama appointed BOJ governor Ichimada Naoto as the Minister of 
Finance and continued the 'one billion yen budget' policy. The US government and 
business circles in Japan strongly supported it. The Japan Federation of Employers’ 
Association (Nikkeiren) made every effort to restrain wages. For this purpose 
Nikkeiren attempted to cooperate with the Right-wing national labour centre, the 
Japanese Trade Union Congress (Zenro) on the one hand, but on the other hand it 
confronted the Left-wing trade union federation Sohyo. Nevertheless, Zenro opposed 
such wage restraint and Sohyo organized the Spring Labour Offensive against it for 
the first time. However, Nikkeiren overwhelmed Sohyo and almost achieved a wage 
restraint. Austerity measures increased exports from Japan soon after. 
 
Although the Right-wing trade unions were against wage restraint, they admitted the 
importance of labour-management cooperation in improving labour productivity so as 
to increase wages by means of economic growth. Therefore, they joined the Japan 
Productivity Centre established mainly by the Japan Association of Corporate 
Executives (Keizai Doyukai) on 1 March. Sohyo naturally criticized the productivity 
movement, but the Japanese government supported the JPC, and more importantly, 
the US government had induced Keizaidoyukai to embark on the productivity 
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movement giving its assistance. The concept of 'productivity' was the key to postwar 
US foreign economic policy, because the improvement of productivity was a kind of 
cure-all which would not only lessen labour-management conflicts, but also contribute 
to economic growth through an increase in exports. This was also true in postwar 
Japan. 
 
The Hatoyama cabinet reorganized the Economic Council Agency (Keizai Shingicho) 
into the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) (Keizai Kikakucho) and formally 
determined the 'Five-year Economic Self-support Plan' on 23 December 1955. As 
pointed out previously, the Director General of the EPA was a famous business leader, 
Takasaki Tatsunosuke, and business circles strongly supported the economic 
planning. This was the first long-term economic plan decided by a cabinet meeting in 
postwar Japan and had the following two targets. The first was economic autonomy 
which was equilibrium in balance of payments achieved by increase in exports mainly 
to the Free World without any special procurements or economic assistance by the 
United States. The second was full employment accomplished by economic growth. 
 
Formation of the Liberal Democratic Party 
In order to secure economic development, it was necessary to achieve a political 
stability by the merger of the conservative parties. To put it more concretely, after the 
general election of April 1953 the ruling parties, that is the Liberal Party under the 5th 
Yoshida cabinet and the Democratic Party under the Hatoyama cabinet, did not have 
an absolute majority in the House of Representatives. Consequently, they had to 
accept the demand from the opposition parties for an additional revision in the budget, 
which greatly damaged their austerity measures. Furthermore, political stability was 
desirable for the implementation of a long-term economic plan and the promotion of 
labour-management cooperation. As a matter of fact, on 27 December 1953 Ogata 
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Taketora, the deputy prime minister of the Yoshida cabinet, and Ashida Hitoshi, an 
influential leader in the Progressive Party, discussed Japan’s economic difficulty and 
agreed on the necessity for a merger of the conservative parties. Ogata publicly 
announced three principles on the merger (the 'Ogata Plan') on 28 March 1954, from 
which moves towards the merger started. Nevertheless, these negotiations collapsed 
on 23 June.  
 
The US government and Japanese business leaders induced the conservative 
political leaders to accomplish the merger. The Eisenhower administration 
determined a new basic policy towards Japan NSC5516/1 on 9 April 1955. This gave 
priority to Japan’s political stability and economic viability over its military power in the 
context of easing international tensions. It was immediately applied to the talks 
regarding Japan’s defence spending for the 1955 fiscal year. As a result, the US 
government agreed to Hatoyama’s demand for a defence spending cut in return for 
the merger promotion as well as maintaining austerity measures. This was the reason 
why Miki Bukichi, the General Council chairman of the Democratic Party, appealed to 
the Liberal Party for the merger (the 'Miki statement') on 12 April, which started 
negotiations between the two parties. Moreover, Finance Minister Ichimada, the 
former BOJ governor and champion of business leaders, spurred on the merger. 
Ichimada accepted the demand for an additional revision in the budget by the Liberal 
Party in exchange for a further development in the merger. Consequently, the two 
parties agreed to set up a joint policy committee for a new party on 30 June. 
 
The final factor which encouraged the parties to merge was the reunion of the JSP on 
13 October. Although the two conservative parties had over half the seats in the 
House of Representatives, it was anticipated that the reunited JSP, then the second 
biggest party, would become the largest party which would come to power in the near 
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future unless the two conservative parties merged. In order to keep the JSP from 
office, the LDP was eventually formed on 15 November. More importantly, the LDP 
tried to counter the JSP by introducing 'progressive' policies since the threat from the 
JSP was because of its policies as well as its seats in the Diet. The core of LDP’s 
policies was to be the realization of a welfare state through economic growth, which 
would undermine the JSP’s support base. This was an important reason why the LDP 
stayed in power until 1993. 
 
The easing of tension after the Korean Armistice had consequences not only for 
international relations but also for domestic policies of countries in the region. In the 
case of Japan, it was a major factor in the establishment of the 1955 system which 
was composed of a party system dominated by the LDP, the economy orientated 
towards the Free World and domestic institutions designed for the purpose of high 
economic growth, in particular labour-management cooperation.9  
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